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Terminator or Super Mario:
Human/Computer Hybrids, Actual
and Virtual
By Noreen Herzfeld
Abstract: Is a human/computer hybrid feasible: If so, in what ways would such hybridization affect our
concept of what it means to be human? There are two forms of such hybridization, the actual and the virtual.
Actual hybridization involves the implantation of mechanical devices in the human body. In actual
hybridization the computer comes to us and to our body to enhance our functioning in our world. In
virtual hybridization we go to the computer, projecting our minds into the world of cyberspace and being
formed there. Perhaps the most common form of virtual hybridization is the immersion our children
experience in the world of video games. Both forms of hybridization encourage us to think of ourselves only
in terms of function, just when most of our theologians find that humans reflect the image of God through
our relationships. This emphasis on function best serves the military, but leaves us in the theological
community with a dissatisfying concept of what it means to be human.
Key Terms: Image of God, Video games, Biomechatronics, Computers.
The Six Million Dollar Man, the Bionic Woman,
Robocop, Dr. Octopus, the Terminator. The sym-
biosis between human and machine has provided
stock characters (known as cyborgs) for science fic-
tion. But are cyborgs confined for all time to the
realm of science fiction? Is a human/computer
hybrid feasible; and in what ways would such hybri-
dization affect our concept of what it means to be
human?
Human/computer hybridization is no longer
just the dream of film writers; there are already
two forms of such hybridization, forms which I
will call the actual and the virtual. Actual hybridi-
zation, like the Six Million Dollar Man, involves
the implantation of mechanical devices in the
human body. This follows a long tradition of
implants such as prosthetic limbs, pacemakers,
and hearing aids and raises only a few new ethical
or religious questions.
Virtual hybridization is a horse of a different
color. In actual hybridization the computer comes
to us and to our body to enhance our functioning in
our world. In virtual hybridization we go to the
computer, projecting our minds into the world of
cyberspace and being formed there. Perhaps the
most common form of virtual hybridization is the
immersion our children experience in the world of
video games. In a hearing before a Senate committee
in 2000, Eugene Provenzo, Professor of Education at
the University of Miami, noted this form of hybri-
dization, claiming that the games provide ‘‘the cul-
tural equivalent of genetic engineering, except that
in this experiment, even more than the other one, we
will be the potential new hybrids, the two-pound
mice.’’1 Virtual hybridization raises far more ethical
and religious questions than actual hybridization
because it is not only current, but common and
insidious.
Noreen Herzfeld is a professor in the Department of Computer Science at St. John’s University in Collegeville, MN. She is the author of In Our
Image: Artificial Intelligence and the Human Spirit (Fortress 2002).
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Actual Hybridization: Computers
embedded in Humans
The idea of implanting mechanical parts in the
human body in order to restore or improve function
is nothing new. Most of us are familiar, and com-
fortable, with the use of prostheses in place of miss-
ing limbs, pacemakers to smooth an erratic
heartbeat, lens implants following cataract surgery,
or cochlear implants that restore or augment hear-
ing. While early mechanical implants were relatively
inert, many today, including the pacemaker and the
cochlear implant, involve an intricate combination
of biology, mechanics, and electronics. The develop-
ment of devices of this type is currently known as
biomechatronics and is a growing research field.
There are current biomechatronic prostheses to aid
motor control, hearing, and vision. These devices
connect directly to the physiological and/or neuro-
logical systems of the human body. In most cases the
imbedded system assumes a limited range of tasks.
Devices for assisting movement have been used in
the treatment of those with impaired motor control
due to stroke, incomplete paraplegia, or cerebral
palsy.2 One example, the Active Ankle-Foot
Orthosis (AAFO), developed at MIT, fits over the
ankle and foot of a patient and restores movement to
a paralyzed or partially paralyzed ankle. A similar
exoskeletal apparatus, the Berkeley Lower Extremity
Exoskeleton (BLEEX) fits over a wearer’s legs and is
used to aid in the bearing of weight while walking.3
Funded by the Defense Advanced Research Project
Agency, Berkeley researchers expect the device to
have applications in the military, firefighting, and
rescue operations.4 BLEEX moves biomechatronics
from the realm of therapy to that of enhancement.
BLEEX is not designed to restore function to an
impaired system. It actually gives the wearer a level
of functioning beyond the body’s normal capability.
While mechanical enhancement of the body’s cap-
abilities is nothing new (the automobile, or even the
mule, are technologies that already enhances the
body’s ability to transport loads over a distance),
what is new is BLEEX’s direct connection to the
user’s body.
Other biomechatronic devices connect directly to
the user’s sensory systems. Researchers at the
University of Pennsylvania, led by Kwabena
Boahen, have developed retinal implants that detect
motion, such as someone shaking his or her head.5
Cochlear implants are currently used by more than
40,000 men and women worldwide.6 Another 250
patients have had bilateral loss of hearing restored
through the use of the auditory brainstem implant.7
Electrodes implanted in the brain limit tremors in
patients with Parkinson’s, mitigate symptoms in
Tourette’s syndrome, and aid in the treatment of
depression.8 All these devices, whether implanted in
the sensory organ or in the brain itself, send and
receive signals in concert with the brain.
Is there a BLEEX equivalent, i.e. a prosthesis that
not only restores normal functioning, but enhances
human performance, on the horizon in the realm of
neurosensory biomechatronics? If implanted chips
restore hearing or vision, why not use them to
enhance sensory capabilities, such as to provide
infrared vision, or to bestow new cognitive capabil-
ities, such as embedding a calculator in the mind?
Steffan Rosahl, of the Department of
Neurosurgery at the University of Freiburg, notes
that any implantation which allows for an exchange
of energy and information between two systems has
the potential to evoke change in either system. In
other words, ‘‘the implanted device may interfere
with the organ it is implanted into. In the case of
sensory implants, the organ of interference is the
human brain, which most scientists today regard as
the physical substrate of the mind.’’9 Sensory
implants thus raise a caution not raised by neuro-
muscular biomechatronics, namely, the potential of
these devices to literally change our minds, to alter
our cognitive functionality, that which we most
closely identify as our selves. Rosahl notes that it is
already possible with current technology to ‘‘equip
or ‘arm’ human beings for better performance, better
mood or other advantages by means of an electronic
implant.’’10 Yet, few have lined up for such enhance-
ments.11 One reason is that sensory implants are
permanent. While the army might find it advanta-
geous to equip its soldiers with night vision, one
must recognize that this feature would not go away
on a soldier’s decommissioning. The soldier is
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equally unlikely to risk permanent loss of vision
should such an implantation go awry. Similarly,
most humans fear the potential loss of a sense of
self or loss of control that a cognitive implant could
engender. Such an implant could be controlled, or at
minimum could malfunction, in the presence of
microwaves, radio waves, or altered magnetic fields.
Virtual Hybridization: Humans
embedded in Cyberspace
If few are rushing to have computers embedded in
them, most of our children gladly embed themselves
in the world of the computer. In a survey of 778
students in grades four through twelve conducted in
December 2003, the National Institute on Media
and the Family found that 87% of all students and
96% of the boys reported playing video games reg-
ularly.12 Adult players also add to the $10 billion a
year industry; the average gamer is now 28 years old.
Like biomechatronics, video games improve
human performance in limited areas. A 2003 study
at the University of Rochester, NY, showed that
proficient gamers markedly improved their spatial
skills and their ability to pay attention to changes
in the visual environment.13 Video games have been
used to help recover mobility in stroke victims and
to overcome fears in the phobic. Cyberspace is an
excellent venue for learning, offing the opportunity
for endless repetition of a task. Thus, many of the
same goals found in the field of biomechatronics can
be realized, not be embedding computers in us but
by embedding our consciousness in the computer.
The first ethical issue arises when one considers
that the skills learned by many video game players
are violent ones. In a study of a random sample of
video games rated T (for Teen) by the
Entertainment Software Rating Board, 98%
included violence, with an average of 122 deaths
per hour of game play. 69% either rewarded a player
for killing or required a player to kill.14 Such first
person shooter games improve marksmanship,
which is why they are used by the US military for
training. But most are used by teens. Attorney
Michael Breen, representing families of three stu-
dents killed in a school shooting in Paducah,
Kentucky, noted their efficacy:
[The shooter] clipped off nine shots in about
a 10-second period. Eight of those shots were
hits. Three were head and neck shots and were
kills. That is way beyond the military standard
for expert marksmanship. This was a kid
who had never fired a pistol in his life, but
because of his obsession with computer
games had turned himself into an expert
marksman.15
But it’s just a game, right? Evidently not to our
brains. Dr. Klaus Mathiak at the University of
Aachen used MRI technology to study the brains
of 13 men who played violent video games for an
average of 2 hours a day. He found that during the
fights in the video game the emotional centers of the
brain associated with aggression, the amygdala and
parts of the anterior cingulate cortex, became more
active. This pattern is associated with aggression and
with the suppression of positive social emotions such
as empathy. Mathiak speculates that playing violent
video games over time would strengthen these pat-
terns in the brain: ‘‘Contrary to what the industry
says, it appears to be more than just a game.’’16 As
educational psychologist Jane Healy puts it, ‘‘habits
of the mind become structures of the brain.’’17 Just
as with biomechatronics, immersion in cyberspace
sets up a cybernetic loop between the human and the
machine, a loop that allows each to be changed by
the other. The player plays the game and the game
plays the player.18
Cyberspace also gives an illusion of human
enhancement. Gamers report feeling empowered,
freed from the structures of normal life. In particu-
lar, in the virtual world one is freed from the limita-
tions of the human body; one can move in three
dimensions, into and through objects, and can
appear and disappear. Nicole Stenger, of the
Human Interface Technology Lab at the University
of Washington, describes how ‘‘cyberspace grafts a
new nature of reality on our everyday life. It opens
up an infinity of space in an eternity of light . . . On
the other side of our data gloves we become creatures
of colored light in motion, pulsing with golden
particles.’’19 Game players experience this freedom
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in their abilities to leap, fly, and float through space,
walk through objects, fire guns without reloading.
This can be a mind-expanding imaginative experi-
ence. However, it can also distance a child from the
real world. Hours spent in front of a screen are hours
not spent messing around outdoors. Carl Pope
describes what is lost:
In losing our contact with the natural world
we are losing something precious. In a way,
we are losing part of what it means to be
human. We evolved in nature, dependent on
its rhythms, inextricably connected to other
living things . . . American children are losing
that connection.20
The ultimate human enhancement is immortal-
ity. Within video games this is simulated through
the option of playing in ‘‘God mode,’’ in which the
player becomes invincible, is given unlimited weap-
ons, special powers, or unlimited lives.21 In the
words of one player, ‘‘I really like games – especially
shooting games – that have some kind of invincibil-
ity option or god-mode, and you get to just run
around and cause total [bleeping] havoc.
Explosions and limbs flying everywhere.
Ahhhh . . . Sometimes that’s just what you need.’’22
Of course, God mode is over once the game is over.
No one can live in cyberspace forever.
Or could they? Oddly enough, even this is con-
sidered a possibility by some researchers. Computer
scientist Ray Kurzweil, in The Age of Spiritual
Machines, suggests that cyberspace provides a place
where we can evade the mortality of the body by
downloading our brains into successive generations
of computer technology. Here we would have the
ultimate embedding of the human in the computer.
Kurzweil writes:
Up until now, our mortality was tied to the
longevity of our hardware. When the hard-
ware crashed, that was it. For many of our
forebears, the hardware gradually deteriorated
before it disintegrated . . . As we cross the
divide to instantiate ourselves into our com-
putational technology, our identity will be
based on our evolving mind file. We will be
software, not hardware . . . As software, our
mortality will no longer be dependent on
the survival of the computing
circuitry . . . [as] we periodically port our-
selves to the latest, evermore capable ‘‘perso-
nal’’ computer . . . Our immortality will be a
matter of being sufficiently careful to make
frequent backups.23
Kurzweil suggests we might achieve this new plat-
form within the next 50 years. He is not the sole
holder of this expectation, though he may be among
the more optimistic in his timeline. Software engi-
neer Michael Benedikt envisions cyberspace as a
place where ‘‘we would enjoy triumphs without
risks and eat of the tree and not be punished, consort
daily with angels, enter heaven now and not
die . . . [it is] the Heavenly City, the New
Jerusalem of the Book of Revelation. Like a beje-
weled, weightless palace it comes out of heaven
itself . . . a place where we might re-enter God’s
graces . . . laid out like a beautiful equation.’’24
Eternity as a never ending video game.
Computer/Human Hybridization
and the Image of God
The therapeutic use of computer technology,
whether in the form of computerized implants or
virtual reality programs, falls easily enough within
the Christian call to heal the sick and help the
suffering. Ted Peters notes that, as morally respon-
sible human beings, we are called to build a better
future for one another, and our work in this area is
‘‘a form of human creativity expressive of the image
of God imparted by the divine to the human race.’’25
Nor does the occasional use of video games for
entertainment or momentary distraction present a
problem that goes much beyond our use of other
media, such as film or television. Yet both types of
computer/human hybridization, particularly as they
move from the realm of therapy to the realm of
enhancement, leave us feeling a bit uneasy. This
unease is not a problem with the concept of
human enhancement, per se. James Peterson notes
that human reality is characterized by change. ‘‘If
human beings are called to develop themselves, pur-
poseful and direct enhancement of capacity could be
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appropriate, or according to some, even required.’’26
The problem with both types of computer/human
hybridization, whether actual or virtual, is that they
are based on an incomplete view of the human
person, one that is merely and entirely functional.
One avenue toward understanding how we con-
ceive of our nature as human persons is to consider
the image of God ‘‘imparted by the divine to the
human race’’ to which Peters refers. Interpretations
of what this image might entail have varied over the
centuries, yet most can be categorized in one of three
ways: substantive interpretations view the image as
an individually held property that is a part of our
nature, most often associated with reason; functional
interpretations find the image of God in agency,
specifically our exercise of dominion over the earth;
relational interpretations locate God’s image within
the relationships we establish and maintain.27 While
substantive interpretations have dominated histori-
cally, twentieth-century theologians have viewed the
image of God in humanity in primarily functional or
relational terms.
A functional interpretation finds the image of
God in the stewardship over the rest of creation
that is spelled out in Genesis 1:26: ‘‘Let us make
humankind in our image, according to our likeness;
and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea,
and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and
over all the wild animals of the earth, and over every
creeping thing that creeps upon the earth.’’ In this
view, what we do lies at the core of who we are. The
functional interpretation stems, not only from a
close reading of Genesis 1:26, but also from an
examination of the use of the term ‘‘image’’ in
extra-Biblical sources. In 1915, Johannes Hehn sug-
gested that the image of God be understood as a
royal title or designation rather than an attribute of
human nature.28 Old Testament scholar Gerhard
von Rad was one of several who extended Hehn’s
work. In his commentary on Genesis, von Rad
argued for our creation ‘‘as the image of God’’ rather
than ‘‘in the image of God.’’29 Von Rad writes:
Just as powerful earthly kings, to indicate
their claim to dominion, erect an image of
themselves in the provinces of their empire
where they do not personally appear, so man
is placed upon earth in God’s image, as God’s
sovereign emblem. He is really only God’s
representative, summoned to maintain and
enforce God’s claim to dominion over the
earth.30
This approach has come to dominate the field of
Biblical exegesis. We are actors, independent agents
in the world, in imitation of God’s agency or, in the
words of Philip Hefner, ‘‘created co-creators.’’
A different approach sees the image of God as
arising in humanity only in and through our rela-
tionships with God or with others. This places the
center of our humanity in a corporate rather than an
individual context; what matters most are the rela-
tional bonds between us. One of the most influential
proponents this interpretation is Karl Barth.
According to Barth, the image of God is identified
with the fact that the human being is a counterpart
to God.31 Like the functionalists, Barth roots his
argument in textual exegesis, focusing, however, on
different portions of the Genesis text: ‘‘Let us make
man in our image’’ (Gn 1:26) and ‘‘male and female
he created them’’ (1:27). Barth interprets the plural
in ‘‘Let us make man’’ as referring, not to a heavenly
court, but to the triune nature of God, a nature
containing both an ‘‘I’’ that can issue a call and a
‘‘Thou’’ capable of response.32
Thus, the Christian understanding of the Trinity
presupposes a God who embodies relationship
within God’s very self. We image God when we
too give ourselves over to relationship. The image
is found in the relationship itself, not the capacity
for relationship. Thus the image of God can only be
evidenced corporately. It exists first in our relation-
ship to God and second, in our relationships with
each other. Barth suggests that it matters not so
much what a human does, but that we exist in a
web of relationship.
Barth takes a highly embodied view of what con-
stitutes authentic relationship. He notes that some
aspects of relationship include the ability the look
the other in the eye, to speak and hear, and to give
aid.33 Biomechatronic systems that restore lost
vision, hearing, or mobility aid this sort of relation-
ality. But what about systems designed for enhance-
ment? These systems focus on function. Their whole
purpose is to increase human functionality in some
realm. Since this functionality would not be
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available to all humans, but only to the wealthy, or
to those with the right military ties, these systems
hold the possibility of being divisive of the human
family, distorting relationships rather than further-
ing them. The fact that research into such systems in
the United States is funded primarily by the military
does nothing to mitigate this concern.
Virtual systems, in particular video games, are not
highly relational. The emphasis is on individual
control and mastery: defeating adversaries, whether
violently or not, beating opponents, designing or
mastering tools. This emphasis on control is not
far from the human will-to-power that, according
to Reinhold Niebuhr, lies at the root of the
Christian concept of sin. Niebuhr notes, ‘‘There is
a pride of power in which the human ego assumes its
self-sufficiency and self-mastery.’’34 To see the self
only in terms of mastery is risky. Some multi-player
games do require interaction and cooperation
between players. EverQuest is one of the most pop-
ular massively multi-player role-playing games.
Players create their own characters, go on quests,
solve puzzles, and kill evil creatures. Other players
can be either teammates or opponents, and some of
the quests can only be solved in groups. However,
such cooperation is rare in the video game world.
Most games demand that the player act alone. Even
in EverQuest, the players must often make decisions
too quickly for them to be in any real sense colla-
borative. In the end, the cyberworld of video games
is a very lonely place.
Conclusion
One place where there is an active use of both virtual
and actual human/computer hybridization is in the
American military. The army uses video games as
both a recruiting tool (America’s Army, and Full
Spectrum Warrior) and as a teaching mechanism.
In 2000, the Pentagon invested $45 million in a
partnership with the video game industry. Even
video games not designed for the military prepare
our young men for battle. As one marine enthused
after a battle in Iraq, ‘‘I was just thinking one thing
when we drove into that ambush, Grand Theft
Auto: Vice City. I felt like I was living it when I
seen the flames coming out of windows, the blown-
up car in the street, guys crawling around shooting
at us. It was fucking cool.’’35 What isn’t cool, of
course, is the unprecedented number of amputees
being produced by the war in Iraq due to the efficacy
of body armor, which protects the torso but not the
limbs. These men come home candidates for com-
puterized prostheses.36 Thus we seduce and train
soldiers with one form of hybridization then fit
them out with the other. Both allow for a less
sober assessment of the war than that which would
be necessary without these hybridization
technologies.
Both biomechatronics and virtual reality pro-
grams, especially when used for enhancement
rather than therapy, promote a preoccupation
with the self, and with our own perfection, mastery,
and control. We seek enhanced performance to
overcome both natural and social insecurity. And
in seeking mastery over our environment, Reinhold
Niebuhr notes how quickly we move from ‘‘power
over matter’’ toward ‘‘power over men.’’37 But this
power is always tainted, for performance and mas-
tery, in the end, refer only to the self. They turn us
inward, failing to lead our vision toward our neigh-
bor and the love of that neighbor that lies at the
heart of Jesus’ teaching.
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